Wednesday, 20 December 1944 — The Battle of the Bulge

The fifth day of Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein saw the battle reach its crisis point. Field Marshal Model and General von Manteuffel formally shifted the offensive’s main effort (Schwerpunkt) from the 6. SS-Panzerarmee to the 5. Panzerarmee, acknowledging the complete failure of the northern thrust. Kampfgruppe Peiper was now completely surrounded at La Gleize and Stoumont, attacked from three directions, while Panzer-Brigade 150 launched its first attack on Malmedy, which was halted by American artillery.

The Front Line — Wednesday, 20 December 1944

Traced from: U.S. 12th Army Group, Situation Maps, 1200 hrs daily, 16 Dec 1944 – 25 Jan 1945. Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division, G5701.S5 (LoC ict21195–ict21235). Approximate positions; interpolated between key dates.

Eisenhower placed the US First and Ninth Armies under Field Marshal Montgomery’s command, a decision that caused lasting friction with General Bradley. Montgomery moved XXX Corps behind the Meuse as a reserve force. American forces attacked Kampfgruppe Peiper from three directions: the 3rd Armored Division from the north, the 82nd Airborne Division from the south at Cheneux, and the 30th Infantry Division from the west.

Northern Shoulder

Stoumont and La Gleize

Kampfgruppe Peiper was now completely cut off. Task Force Lovelady of the 3rd Armored Division severed the last supply route between La Gleize and Coo. American forces attacked from three directions throughout the day. At the St. Edouard Sanatorium, grim hand-to-hand fighting saw the building change hands twice. By night, Peiper held only Stoumont, La Gleize, and a toehold in Cheneux.

Battle of Cheneux

The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment assaulted Cheneux against well-organised SS defences with 20mm flak guns, half-tracks, and tanks. After a failed daylight assault, the 1st Battalion launched a night attack at 19:30 across open ground swept by intense fire. The assault cost 225 casualties—approximately one-third of the battalion—with B Company reduced to 18 men. The 1st Battalion later received the Presidential Unit Citation.

Elsenborn Ridge

The defence remained solid. The 3. Panzergrenadier-Division launched three assaults against the 99th Infantry Division positions but was repulsed each time. Over 300 American guns on the ridge created a killing ground. After this day, the front remained static for more than three weeks.

First Attack on Malmedy

Skorzeny ordered Kampfgruppe Y of Panzer-Brigade 150 to attack Malmedy. At c. 20:00, the force moved toward the Baugnez crossroads in darkness and snow, but an American artillery barrage completely blocked all progress, inflicting 60–70 killed and wounded. Scherf ordered a withdrawal to Ligneuville.

Central Sector

St. Vith

The American defenders resisted determined German efforts. The bulk of the 18. Volksgrenadier-Division deployed directly in front of St. Vith, but no major attack succeeded. XVIII Airborne Corps assumed overall command of the salient—the first command order the defenders had received in three days. Montgomery suggested withdrawing from St. Vith and Elsenborn Ridge; Hodges stubbornly refused.

Bastogne Encircled

German forces completed the encirclement of Bastogne. The 101st Airborne Division and attached units began their defence. The Panzer-Lehr-Division reached Marvie, east of Bastogne. Engineers at Ortheuville held the Bailey bridge long enough for fuel and ammunition to reach Bastogne before German tanks seized it in the evening.

Hotton Bridge

Engineers of the 51st Engineer Combat Battalion held the critical timber bridge at Hotton against German armour. Private Lee Ishmael and Sergeant Kenneth Kelly disabled a Tiger tank with a 37mm round and a bazooka hit. The engineers held the bridge until 84th Infantry Division reinforcements arrived.

Southern Shoulder

Ettelbruck–Echternach

The 109th Infantry Regiment established a defensive line from Ettelbruck through Oberfeulen to Merzig. The 80th Infantry Division took up reserve positions north-east of Mersch. The 4th Infantry Division moved to take over positions near Echternach in an unsuccessful attempt to relieve isolated infantry there.

Arlon–Bastogne Axis

III Corps moved its headquarters from Metz to Arlon and assembled the 4th Armored Division with the 26th and 80th Infantry Divisions. Elements of CCB, 4th Armored Division pushed toward Bastogne. Operational control of VIII Corps passed to Third Army during the day.

Allied Command

Montgomery Assumes Northern Command

Eisenhower shifted command of the US First and Ninth Armies to Field Marshal Montgomery, reflecting the need for unified control of the northern shoulder. The decision left Bradley’s 12th Army Group with command only of Third Army and caused lasting friction within the American command structure.

XXX Corps Moves Behind the Meuse

At 02:30, a British officer arrived at First Army headquarters to inform General Hodges that Montgomery was moving XXX Corps behind the Meuse. The speed of the decision was contrary to German expectations—they had assumed such a command change would take weeks through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but it was accomplished in minutes by phone calls.

German Schwerpunkt Shift

Field Marshal Model and General von Manteuffel decided to shift the main emphasis of the offensive from the 6. SS-Panzerarmee to the 5. Panzerarmee. At noon, Model redirected the II. SS-Panzerkorps toward the centre of the Bulge.