Saturday, 16 December 1944
At 05:30, approximately 1,900 German artillery pieces opened fire across an 80-mile front from Monschau to Echternach, beginning Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein. Three German armies, roughly 250,000 men and 700 tanks, struck six American divisions holding 120 kilometres of the “Ghost Front.” The surprise was total. German searchlights created artificial moonlight as infantry emerged from the morning mist.
Despite achieving complete tactical surprise, the Germans failed to reach first-day objectives anywhere on the front. Small groups of American soldiers, often in isolated outposts, fought desperate delaying actions that disrupted the operational timetable. By evening, Eisenhower had recognised the assault as a major offensive and begun releasing reserves. “The story of December 16, 1944, is the story of a series of apparently disconnected small unit actions.”
Northern Shoulder
Approximately 1,900 guns open fire across the Ardennes front. The coordinated bombardment lasts 2–2.5 hours, targeting front-line positions, command posts, and communications. German searchlights illuminate the advance. American communications are severed across the sector.
246. Volksgrenadier-Division attacks toward Monschau but is repelled by the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. 326. Volksgrenadier-Division gains only 2–3 km at Höfen against the 395th Infantry, 99th Infantry Division. The only sector where the Germans make no significant incursion.
277. Volksgrenadier-Division attacks through the forest toward the Twin Villages, the primary breakthrough objective for 6. SS-Panzerarmee. Five battalions of the green 99th Infantry Division hold. By evening, I. SS-Panzerkorps commits Kampfgruppe Müller of 12. SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend with armour. Americans still contest the woods at nightfall.
The 2nd Infantry Division captures “Heartbreak Crossroads” as part of V Corps’ Roer dams offensive. Upon recognising the German counteroffensive, Robertson halts the attack. The hard-won position will be relinquished within hours.
An 18-man Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 394th Infantry Regiment holds a hilltop outside Lanzerath all day, repelling repeated paratrooper attacks. Their stand delays 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler by nearly twenty hours. By late afternoon, 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division captures Lanzerath.
Small cavalry outposts at Krewinkel and Afst repel early assaults, inflicting c. 150 German dead at Krewinkel alone. But the 18th Cavalry Squadron strongpoints are overrun by 12. Volksgrenadier-Division, opening a large breach for I. SS-Panzerkorps.
Peiper spends 05:00–14:00 waiting at 12. Volksgrenadier-Division’s command post for an infantry breakthrough that never comes. His 800-vehicle column is snarled in a massive traffic jam near Scheid involving three divisions. A blown railway bridge forces a bypass; forgotten German minefields cost several vehicles. By midnight, barely 15 km covered; the Kampfgruppe reaches Lanzerath a full day behind schedule.
Central Sector
18. Volksgrenadier-Division attacks north and south of the Schnee Eifel to encircle the 106th Infantry Division’s forward regiments. The 14th Cavalry Group is forced back, opening the Losheim Gap. At Kobscheid, the 18th Cavalry Squadron holds for a day before withdrawing. German pincers close but do not yet link up. Communications failures prevent early withdrawal of exposed units.
Manteuffel’s 5. Panzerarmee crosses the Our at Dasburg and Gemünd, but bridge construction delays mean most armour stays east of the river until late afternoon. Only the Dasburg bridge remains passable, forcing panzer divisions to cross sequentially.
The 28th Infantry Division faces heavy pressure at Marnach and Hosingen. The 112th Infantry holds in the south and delays German crossings. Street fighting at Bleialf stalls the German southern pincer. The Germans do not reach the Clerf crossings.
Southern Shoulder
Brandenberger’s 7. Armee attacks the 4th Infantry Division along the Sauer river. German forces cross at Wallendorf and Bollendorf, but the 12th Infantry Regiment contains the assault. The mission is primarily defensive: to protect Manteuffel’s southern flank against Patton’s Third Army.
Allied Command
At Spa, First Army HQ learns of the attack at 06:15 via AA brigade reports. Disrupted communications prevent a clear picture all day. Hodges initially assesses a diversionary attack and does not issue directives until 17:00, eleven hours after the assault. Gerow’s request to cancel the Wahlerscheid offensive is denied.
At Versailles, Eisenhower, just promoted to five-star rank, immediately recognises a major offensive: “That’s no spoiling attack.” He orders the 7th Armored Division south from Ninth Army, transfers the 10th Armored from Patton to VIII Corps, and alerts XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd and 101st Airborne) near Reims. Bradley remains noncommittal.
11:20, Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division released to 106th Infantry Division. 17:30, 7th Armored Division alerted. 19:30, 30th Infantry Division alerted. 20:00, Clarke (CCB, 7th Armored Division) departs for Bastogne, arriving at 04:00 on the 17th. Midnight, 1st Infantry Division attached to V Corps; 26th Infantry Regiment directed to Elsenborn.
Col. Anderson’s engineers at Trois-Ponts are positioned directly in the path of the German advance. At Malmedy, four heavy-calibre shells strike near the 44th Field Evacuation Hospital at 05:30. Pergrin inspects and drives to Baugnez and Born, finding the area swarming with 106th Division troops. No one yet knows what is coming.