Division Commander’s Report

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The Alert

On the evening of 17 December 1944, the 82d Airborne Division was in camp at Suippes and Sissonne, France, recovering from Operation Market Garden.Camp Suippes and Camp Sissonne lay in the Champagne region, roughly 500 km from the Ardennes front. See Suippes-Sissonne. The first word of the German offensive reached Gavin through a telephone call from XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters. His account of the alert sequence establishes the speed with which the airborne divisions were committed.

“At about 1930 hours, while at dinner with the Staff, I received a ‘phone call from Colonel Eaton, Chief of Staff, XVIII Corps (Airborne). He stated that he had just received a call from SHAEF to the effect that the situation on the front to the east appeared to be critical; that the airborne divisions were to be prepared to move 24 hours after daylight the following day; that the Corps Commander, General Ridgway, was in England and could not be contacted immediately. I instructed Colonel Eaton to issue orders to the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division, Brigadier General McAuliffe, to prepare immediately for movement in accordance with the SHAEF estimate, 24 hours after daylight. I assembled my Staff in the Division War Room at 2000 hours. I had listened to a radio news broadcast at 1800 hours and was aware of the fact that a German penetration was being made in the direction of St. Vith.”Gavin, as senior division commander present, exercised temporary corps authority in Ridgway’s absence. Ridgway was in England and did not reach the continent until 19 December. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Readiness and Movement Orders

Gavin emphasises that the division’s habitual readiness posture, born of repeated emergency deployments, allowed it to move at short notice. The passage is revealing both for what it says about airborne doctrine and for its implicit contrast with the less mobile infantry divisions then holding the Ardennes front.

“The division was ready for a quick move, since, because of our past and usual quick commitments, we have maintained a high degree of readiness as a standard operating procedure. A basic load of ammunition was in the hands of each regiment, complete in all respects. Two ‘K’ and two ‘D’ rations for the Division were at hand and could be distributed in a matter of hours. All weapons, uniform and equipment were up to an operating standard.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

Later that evening, Gavin assembled his unit commanders and issued movement orders. The original destination was Bastogne; the 82d was to move first, the 101st to follow.

“Unit Commanders at Camp Sissonne were assembled with the Staff in the War Room at 2100 hours when the situation was outlined to them and a tentative plan for the movement to Bastogne issued. At about 2130 hours I received a call from the Chief of Staff, XVIII Corps (Airborne), who said that Corps had orders to move without delay in the direction of Bastogne where further orders would be received. He also said that Corps was to be attached to the First United States Army. After further discussion I decided that the 82d Airborne Division would move approximately one hour after daylight and move in the direction of Bastogne. The 101st Airborne Division was to move at 1400 hours, 18 December, also in the direction of Bastogne. At that time Oise Base Section was devoting all its efforts to pulling in all transportation off the roads to provide the necessary lift for both divisions.”The 82d ultimately went to Werbomont, not Bastogne. The 101st continued to Bastogne under VIII Corps. The diversion was ordered at First Army headquarters the following morning. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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First Army Headquarters

Gavin drove through the night to Spa, arriving at First Army headquarters on the morning of 18 December. His account of the meeting with General Hodges provides a first-hand picture of the confusion prevailing at army level, including early reports of the action at Stavelot and the encirclement of the 106th Division.

“At 2330 I left with my G-1, Lt. Col. Alfred W. Ireland, and my Aide, Captain Hugo V. Olson, for the command post of the First United States Army at Spa. The drive was very difficult due to the general condition of the roads, rain and fog, and the absence of bridges on a number of important highways. I reported to General Hodges in person at about 0900 hours 18 December. At that time the situation appeared rather vague. The first reports of enemy contact at Stavelot were just coming in. It was reported that an enemy force at Stavelot had driven our troops across the river and had succeeded in capturing and destroying a large gas supply. They apparently blew the bridges upon driving out our forces. The situation south and west of Stavelot was unknown except that the enemy had evidently overrun our front positions. There appeared to be a large force of U. S. troops centered on St. Vith. There also appeared to be a large pocket of the 106th Division surrounded in the Eifel. After some staff discussion, the Commanding General, First U. S. Army decided to attach the 82d Airborne Division to V Corps. It was to close in an area in the vicinity of Werbomont. The 101st Airborne Division was to be attached to VIII Corps and would assemble in the vicinity of Bastogne. I placed a request with the First U. S. Army for tanks, TD’s, 4.2’s and medium artillery, and left the CP for Werbomont. At this time there was considerable movement west of service and command installations in and around Spa. It was apparently being evacuated.”Gavin’s reference to “a large gas supply” at Stavelot conflates the fuel dump south of the town with events in Stavelot itself. The main fuel depot was at Francorchamps, not Stavelot, and it was not captured; most of the fuel was evacuated or destroyed by American engineers. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Werbomont and the Amblève

Gavin reached Werbomont in the mid-afternoon and immediately reconnoitred the area, discovering that German forces were reported near Habiemont and that civilians were fleeing westward from Trois-Ponts. His description of the intact bridge at Forge is significant: it was across this bridge that elements of Kampfgruppe Peiper’s reconnaissance would later attempt to reach Werbomont.

“I arrived at Werbomont at approximately mid-afternoon and immediately made a reconnaissance of the entire area. It offered excellent defensive possibilities, being the dominant terrain for many miles from the crossroads at Werbomont. At about 1600 hours I contacted an engineer platoon at the bridge at Habiemont. The bridge was prepared for demolition and they reported the Germans were in the immediate vicinity, coming over the main highway from Trois-Ponts. At that time a number of civilians were very excitedly moving west on the Trois-Ponts—Werbomont road. They all stated that the Germans had passed Trois-Ponts and were ‘coming this way’. I made a reconnaissance down the valley from Habiemont to the Amblève River but encountered no enemy or any indication of his whereabouts. One bridge was still intact at Forge and was not prepared for demolition.”The bridge at Forge, south-east of Habiemont, was the route by which Kampfgruppe Peiper’s reconnaissance elements crossed the Amblève that evening. It was subsequently blown by American engineers. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Dash to Bastogne

With the division still en route, Gavin drove south to Bastogne to deliver orders to Brigadier General McAuliffe in person. The passage captures the disintegration of VIII Corps’s situational awareness and the isolation already closing around Bastogne.

“At about 1630 hours I left for Bastogne to meet General McAuliffe. I reported to the VIII Corps CP in Bastogne and had a short conversation with General Middleton and talked to his G-2 and G-3. At that time the Corps CP was preparing to move. The situation was very vague. The 28th Division officers present seemed to feel that their division had been overrun, although they were uncertain of its whereabouts. I met General McAuliffe, gave him his orders that he was to assemble in Bastogne, reporting to the Corps Commander of the VIII Corps, and I left, moving north and passing through Houffalize shortly after dark. I arrived in Werbomont at approximately 2000 hours and about that time the first large group of 82d vehicles started arriving.”Gavin passed through Houffalize only hours before the Germans cut the Bastogne–Werbomont road. By dawn on 19 December this route was closed. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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First Contact

The division’s first encounter with the enemy came not from its own patrols but from a 30th Infantry Division roadblock at Habiemont. Gavin visited the site at dawn on 19 December and found the wreckage of Kampfgruppe Peiper’s reconnaissance probe, which had attempted to push from Trois-Ponts to Werbomont via Forge the previous evening.

“About two hours after daylight December 19th the division closed in that area. In the meantime the first enemy contact was made at Habiemont. A road block of the 30th Division was contacted by a German armored reconnaissance party at about 1900 hours the 18th. I visited the locality at daylight December 19th and found about five armored vehicles, armored cars and SP’s, knocked out, with several German dead lying about the road. About a platoon of 2nd Bn, 119th Infantry was present. They reported that all of their road block party proper, despite having knocked out the German reconnaissance party, had either been killed or captured or had moved west. It appeared quite clear that this was a reconnaissance party of a German armored column that had been endeavoring to move from Trois-Ponts to Werbomont and had succeeded in crossing the river at Forge. The Habiemont bridge was blown. At daylight, December 19, it was learned that the north-south road from Bastogne to Werbomont had been cut by the Germans in the vicinity of Houffalize.”The roadblock at Habiemont was manned by elements of the 119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, which had arrived in the area independently of the 82d Airborne. See Habiemont. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Initial Dispositions

With the division closed into Werbomont, Gavin pushed his regiments forward on 19 December to establish a perimeter facing east and south-east. The dispositions described here formed the initial defensive line from which the 82d would operate for the next week.

“In compliance with instructions received from Corps Headquarters, the 504th Parachute Infantry advanced and seized the high ground northwest of Rahier and the 505th Parachute Infantry advanced and seized the high ground in the vicinity of Heid-des-Bieux. The 508th Parachute Infantry sent one company to the crossroads one mile east of Bra. This regiment, less one company, occupied the high ground in the vicinity of Chevron. The 325th Glider Infantry remained at Werbomont, having sent the third battalion to the vicinity of Bervaux and one company to the crossroads at Manhay. These dispositions were consolidated during the night of December 19–20 and patrols pushed to the front to gain contact with the enemy.”The crossroads east of Bra and the high ground near Chevron would become key terrain features in the days that followed. Manhay, held initially by a single glider infantry company, later became the scene of heavy fighting. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Order to Seize Cheneux

At dawn on 20 December, Gavin met Colonel Reuben Tucker of the 504th Parachute Infantry at Rahier and received civilian intelligence that a large German armoured force had passed through Cheneux the previous afternoon. The passage that follows is among the most quoted in 82d Airborne historiography: Gavin’s reasoning for ordering a lightly armed parachute regiment to seize a bridge held by armour.

“Shortly after daylight, December 20, I met Colonel Reuben Tucker, 504th Commanding Officer, in the town of Rahier at which time he had just received intelligence from civilians to the effect that approximately 125 vehicles, including approximately 30 tanks, had moved through the town the afternoon before, moving in the direction of Cheneux. The information appeared to be reliable. It posed some interesting problems. It appeared that the Germans had given up hope of crossing the creek obstacle at Habiemont with their heavy armor and had turned to the main road through Stoumont–La Gleize. If this were the case, the seizure of the bridge over the Amblève River at Cheneux was imperative if their further movement was to be blocked. I ordered Colonel Tucker to move into the town of Cheneux without delay and, conditions permitting, to seize the bridge. It was imperative that the bridge be seized. If 125 armored vehicles engaged the 504th in the country around Rahier we were in for some anxious moments, but we had come a long way to find the German and we had beaten in the past better units than these appeared to be, even with our limited means, so there was but one thing to do and that was to close with the enemy as rapidly as possible and destroy him by any means possible. But the seizure of the bridge was imperative.”The vehicles reported at Cheneux belonged to Kampfgruppe Peiper, 1. SS-Panzer-Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. The bridge over the Amblève at Cheneux was one of the last crossings by which Peiper could reinforce or withdraw. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Cheneux and Trois-Ponts

The fight for Cheneux began on 20 December with a patrol contact at the western edge of the village and developed into a two-day battle. Gavin describes the action at Cheneux and the simultaneous pressure on the 505th Parachute Infantry along the Salm River line near Trois-Ponts.

“Initial contact was made at the western exit of Cheneux by a patrol which had been sent from Rahier by the first battalion of the 504th. They fired on a German motorcyclist who was accompanied by a small patrol. Contact was first made on the ridge one-half mile west of Cheneux. This small patrol was followed by approximately a company of Germans moving along the ridge. They were engaged at once and a heavy fight took place, lasting all day long. This German force, it was now known, was the advance guard of a reinforcement battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 1st battalion of the 504th drove them back into Cheneux, the battalion commander setting up his command post in a building in the western limits of Cheneux on the main road during the hours of darkness of the first night.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

On the same day, the 504th launched its final assault on Cheneux. Gavin’s account of the close-quarters fighting is characteristically direct.

“On this date the first battalion of the 504th, assisted by a company of the third battalion of that regiment, made a final, all-out assault on the Germans in that town and in close hand-to-hand fighting, many of the parachute troops jumping aboard the German half-tracks and knifing the Germans at their posts, the Germans were driven back across the Amblève River and our troops seized the bridge.”The seizure of the Cheneux bridge effectively sealed the south-western exit of the Kampfgruppe Peiper pocket. See Cheneux for a detailed place chronology. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

Meanwhile, east of the division sector, the 505th Parachute Infantry was engaged in a grinding defensive fight along the Salm River.

“Further to the south and east, the 505th Parachute Infantry was having very hard fighting with the remainder of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 505th had initially sent a covering force east of the Salm River in the vicinity of Trois-Ponts. Through sheer weight of numbers this small force was finally driven to the river line where it held. Being very much overextended, the regiment managed to hold by diagnosing or estimating the point of German main effort from time to time and then marshalling all available infantry as quickly as possible and beating off the attack at that point. This process was repeated, where necessary, day and night until finally the German attacks waned in their intensity about December 23.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Advance to Vielsalm

On the night of 20–21 December, the division extended its line south-eastward to Vielsalm, establishing contact with the 7th Armored Division and the remnants of the 106th Infantry Division around St. Vith. Gavin’s account of meeting Generals Hasbrouck and Jones reveals the condition of the forces fighting in the St. Vith salient.

“Orders to accomplish this were issued at the division CP at Habiemont shortly before dark, December 20. Units moved promptly and by daylight were on their objectives, well organized and prepared to defend. Regiments were in the line in the order, left to right: 504, 505, 508, 325. One battalion of the 325 was held in division reserve in the vicinity of Lierneux. The division forward CP was established in the town of Lierneux at the railroad crossing on the northern edge of the town.”Lierneux served as the division forward command post throughout the critical period 21–24 December. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

“In Vielsalm contact was made with General Hasbrouck who had established the CP of the 7th Armored Division in the town. The division was then fighting around St. Vith. West of Vielsalm, General Jones had established the CP of the 106th Division at Renevaux. From a visit to both of these officers I learned that the 7th Armored Division, except for battle losses, was intact and fighting with unity of effort. The 106th Division appeared to be rather badly chewed up and had but one regiment, the 424th Infantry, remaining, with some division artillery and divisional units.”Maj. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck commanded the 7th Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones commanded the 106th Infantry Division, which had lost two of its three regiments (the 422nd and 423rd) to encirclement on the Schnee Eifel. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Decisive Neck

By 21 December, the 82d Airborne Division held the only corridor connecting the St. Vith defenders to the rest of First Army. Gavin understood the operational significance of this narrow passage.

“On this date, December 21, however, only the narrow neck of land from Vielsalm to Salmchateau, held by the 82d Airborne Division, connected the St. Vith forces with remaining forces of the First Army. Its retention would be decisive.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Withdrawal Question

The question of whether to withdraw from the Vielsalm salient generated friction between Gavin and his corps commander. Gavin makes clear his objection to the withdrawal, while acknowledging the tactical logic behind it. His reconnaissance of fallback positions indicates that planning for a withdrawal was already under way by 21–22 December.

“I objected to the withdrawal but the Corps Commander explained that regardless of my wishes in the matter it might be necessary to require the division to withdraw. It was quite evident at this time that if a major German attack developed from the south, threatening the right of the division, its continued occupation of the salient extending out to Vielsalm would be costly in life and to no advantage after the extrication of the St. Vith forces.”The “Corps Commander” was Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who had arrived to take command of XVIII Airborne Corps on 19 December. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

“At its completion it was quite clear that there was but one reasonably good defensive position and that was the Trois-Ponts–Basse-Bodeux–Bra–Manhay line. At the direction of the Corps Commander a reconnaissance was also made of a position farther to the rear, generally along the Cheneux–Rahier–Chevron–Werbomont line.”The Trois-Ponts–Basse-Bodeux–Bra–Manhay line became the division’s main defensive position after the Christmas Eve withdrawal. The second fallback line, through Cheneux, Chevron, and Werbomont, was never needed. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Right Flank Crisis

From 22 December, the division’s right flank came under increasing pressure from the 2. SS-Panzer-Division advancing north through Ottré and Joubiéval. Gavin’s narrative of this period describes the struggle for the Rogne–Lierneux ridge, which he regarded as the key terrain on the southern sector of his front.

“The loss of Rogne–Lierneux ridge would result in the complete neutralization of the defensive capabilities of the right portion of the division sector. This ridge dominated the entire road net from Vielsalm to Bra. This was the only road net south of the Trois-Ponts–Werbomont road. In addition, all of the division’s installations and division artillery were located in the Lierneux–Fronome–Vielsalm valley. Accordingly, orders were issued to the 325th Glider Infantry to extend its right flank and seize and hold Rogne and the ridge extending north therefrom. This ridge had to be held at any cost.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

On the afternoon of 22 December, German armour appeared in strength south of the division sector.

“On the afternoon of December 22 an enemy force of approximately 100 vehicles of all types preceded by about 25 tanks advanced north through Ottré. The tanks entered Joubiéval. They were permitted to close up, then brought under devastating artillery fire. Artillery observers who remained on the outpost line on the ridge immediately north of Ottré kept the column under close observation and put very effective artillery fire on it. This unit was later identified as a portion of the 2d SS Panzer Division.”The 2. SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich was advancing northward as part of II. SS-Panzerkorps, aiming to exploit the gap between the 82d Airborne and the forces around Bastogne. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

An attempt to destroy the bridge at Petite-Langlir met the enemy head-on. The demolition was eventually accomplished by a daring patrol behind German lines.

“As the demolition party moved south from Ottré it encountered a large group of German vehicles coming northward. The Germans had the bridge. This was at about 1400 hours. Evidently thoroughness in preparation had cost us the bridge. During the night of December 22–23 an engineer patrol, lead by Major J. C. H. Lee, Jr., made its way behind the enemy lines to the bridge over the creek south of Petite-Langlir and destroyed the bridge while it was actually being used by German vehicles. They displayed unusual gallantry and perseverance in the performance of their task.”Major J. C. H. Lee, Jr. was the son of Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, commanding general of the Communications Zone (COMZ). The younger Lee received the Distinguished Service Cross for this action. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

The 325th Glider Infantry’s counterattack to retake Rogne yielded an unexpected intelligence windfall.

“On this date the enemy attacked in considerable strength and overran the town of Rogne. The 325 was ordered to counterattack and retake the town. The retention of this ridge was most vital if the division were to accomplish its mission of extricating the St. Vith forces. Supported by attached armor and with unusual gallantry and elan, the 325 attacked and retook the town and held it until later ordered to withdraw. It was on this occasion that the Regimental Adjutant of a regiment of the 2d SS Panzer Division was captured with the orders for the advance of the following day. In the confusion incident to the retaking of the town by the 325, he had been sent forward by his Regimental Commander to learn the true situation. During his reconnaissance he found himself aboard a motorcycle side car in the outskirts of Rogne when our troops were retaking the town. He was captured with the town and had the orders on his person. They proved to be of great value, since they gave us definite information of the enemy’s intentions for the following several days.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Fraiture Falls

On the afternoon of 23 December, Gavin personally inspected the Fraiture ridge, the extreme right of his division’s sector. His account of the thin defensive line and the loss of the crossroads is one of the most vivid passages in the report.

“On the afternoon of December 23, at about 1700 hours, I checked the dispositions along the Fraiture ridge. At this time riflemen were scattered 100 to 200 yards apart. There was a little antitank defense, and the possibility of defending the ridge against a major German attack appeared nothing less than fantastic. On the other hand, nothing could be spared from the other fronts, since the situation was much the same in other sectors, although the threat was not as great. At about 1730 hours, I arrived at the CP of Captain Gibson in the town of Fraiture. It was then under heavy mortar fire. A considerable volume of small arms fire could be heard to the south and west. SCR-300 contact was made with Captain Woodruff at the crossroads. He stated that he was under terrific attack which was completely engulfing his small unit. I moved on foot from Fraiture towards the crossroads and managed to reach the edge of the woods several hundred yards beyond the town.”The crossroads at Fraiture (known to the Americans as “Parker’s Crossroads” after Maj. Arthur C. Parker III) fell to elements of the 2. SS-Panzer-Division on the evening of 23 December. Captain Junior R. Woodruff commanded the mixed force defending the intersection. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Rear Wide Open

With Fraiture lost, the German advance threatened to roll into the division’s rear area. Gavin drove through the night to assess the situation and found Manhay, the key crossroads behind his right flank, abandoned.

“At this point it was evident that there was nothing to prevent the German forces from entering the rear of the Division area, which was now closely engaged along its entire 25,000-yard front. I moved to the CP of the reserve battalion in the region southwest of Lierneux, arriving there at about dark. I issued verbal orders to the battalion commander, Major Wollems, outlining the situation to him and directing him to secure the right flank as far west as Hébronval. I then moved without delay via Trois-Ponts to Manhay, the CP of the 3d Armored Division. Here I found one MP on duty at the crossroads and the town completely abandoned.”Manhay fell to the 2. SS-Panzer-Division on the night of 24–25 December. The 3d Armored Division’s withdrawal from the crossroads left a gap that Gavin describes here with evident alarm. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Christmas Eve

The withdrawal from the Vielsalm salient on the night of 24–25 December was, in Gavin’s assessment, the finest operation the division executed during the campaign. His praise for the troops is notable for its directness, as is his acknowledgement that the men disagreed with the order.

“In all of the operations in which we have participated in our two years of combat and they have been many of multitudinous types, I have never seen a better executed operation than the withdrawal on Christmas Eve. The troops willingly and promptly carried into execution all the withdrawal plans, although they openly and frankly criticized it and failed to understand the necessity for it. But everybody pitched in and the withdrawal went smoothly. Christmas Eve was a very cold, bright moonlight night. The enemy was closely engaged with us on the entire front from Trois-Ponts to Malmedy, but there was in no locality any feeling of unusual pressure being exerted against us.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Withdrawal

The withdrawal itself was not without incident. The 508th Parachute Infantry fought a sharp action at the Salm River bridges, and during the movement a remarkable coincidence occurred: the 82d’s withdrawing columns passed through Kampfgruppe Peiper’s breakout force, which was simultaneously infiltrating eastward through the same area.

“The 508 was attacked in great force and had some close and intense fighting at the bridges over the Salm River before it finally withdrew. Its shell on Thier-du-Mont was apparently cut off, but finally made its way back under the command of Major Taylor without the loss of a single man.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

During the night, reports reached Gavin of unidentified troops moving through the division’s rear area.

“Earlier in the night a report was received from vehicle drivers that while driving their jeeps on a road in the vicinity of Rasse-Bodeux they observed troops wearing full field equipment walking in the woods towards the east. These troops hit the ground and took cover, generally acting very evasive. Later in the night a lineman, checking his lines, had his jeep shot up by what he guessed were German troops in the rear area.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

“I talked to the regimental commander about the situation and he believed that at this time a force of approximately 500 Germans were somewhere in the regimental rear area moving to the east. Their presence could hardly be accounted for unless they had escaped from the La Gleize-Stoumont pocket.”This was indeed Kampfgruppe Peiper’s breakout force. On the night of 23–24 December, approximately 800 men of Kampfgruppe Peiper abandoned their vehicles and infiltrated on foot from La Gleize eastward across the Salm River. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

The following morning, the identification was confirmed in an action near Grand Halleux.

“Several hours before daylight one platoon positioned north of Grand Halleux was attacked by a German force of great strength. A heavy fight ensued. A number of Germans were killed and wounded, as well as troopers of the Division. Among those captured was an American major of the U.S. 30th Infantry Division. He had been captured in earlier fighting at La Gleize and the force that was accompanying him when captured was a force of approximately 500-600 Germans endeavoring to withdraw to their own lines east of the Salm River. During their withdrawal they were rather well chewed up but they nevertheless succeeded in reaching their lines except for several killed and captured. On December 25th we realized that we had just succeeded in withdrawing through a hostile withdrawing force, which was a rather novel maneuver.”The “American major” was Maj. Hal D. McCown of the 119th Infantry Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, who had been captured at La Gleize on 21 December. McCown’s own account of the breakout march is an important corroborating source. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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The Counteroffensive

After the withdrawal to the Trois-Ponts–Bra–Manhay line, the division held its positions through the final days of December. During this period, it repelled a major attack by the 9. SS-Panzer-Division, which Gavin regarded as a more formidable opponent than the 1. SS-Panzer-Division elements encountered earlier.

“The 9th SS Panzer Division appeared to be much better equipped and better trained. They launched an attack up the main axis from Lierneux to Habiemont, hitting the 508 and 504 in a coordinated attack that was characterized by great dash and courage. The 3d Battalion of the 505 was completely overrun. His men remained, however, manning their positions in the houses and foxholes. The battalion commander, Lt. Colonel Mendez, obtained the use of the reserve company of the 2d Battalion of the 508 on his left, counter-attacked with great gallantry and determination, and drove the 9th SS Panzers from his positions, restoring his MLR. The storm trooper losses were extremely heavy. From one field alone 62 bodies were later removed. On interrogation some of the Storm Troopers stated that they had been accustomed to attacking with such dash and elan, yelling and firing their weapons, and the usual reaction of the enemy was to break and run as the Storm Troopers closed with them. They were frankly surprised to find troops who would man their positions after being overrun.”Lt. Col. Louis Mendez commanded the 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The 9. SS-Panzer-Division Hohenstaufen was part of II. SS-Panzerkorps, which had been committed to exploit the initial breakthrough. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

The failure of the 9. SS-Panzer-Division’s attack marked the end of German offensive operations in the 82d Airborne’s sector. Gavin summarises the subsequent counterattack.

“This ended all offensive efforts of the German forces in the Battle of the Bulge. About a week later the division attacked, completely overrunning the 62d V.G. Division and the 9th SS Panzer Division, and capturing 2,500 prisoners, including 3 battalion commanders. It regained its former position on the Thier-du-Mont heights.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Siegfried Line and the Roer

Gavin’s report concludes with a compressed account of the division’s operations after the Bulge: the attack east of St. Vith through the Siegfried Line and the subsequent advance to the Roer River. These passages, though brief, record what Gavin considered the most physically demanding combat the division had experienced.

“From here the Division withdrew to a rest area from which it was later committed to the attack east of St. Vith, attacking through deep snow over thickly wooded mountains and overrunning a considerable group of German defensive forces in a constant day and night attack lasting for six days. Ultimately they drove into the Siegfried Line to seize Udenbreth and the ridge extending south. This attack was the most arduous in the Division’s history and, at its end, probably the most bitterly fought, but the Division once again entered Germany and the seizure of Udenbreth placed the First U.S. Army in a position to attack down ridge lines all the way to Bonn.” (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

“From here the Division moved to the Hurtgen sector where, as a member of XVIII Corps (Airborne) and later III Corps, it participated in the advance to the Roer River. Except for extensive minefields, extremely difficult road conditions and hostile artillery fire, the operation was not too difficult. The Division arrived on the Roer River and had completed detailed plans for a river crossing and the seizure of ridges east of the river when it was withdrawn on February 17th and returned to the Sissonne-Suippes, France, area.”The division returned to Suippes-Sissonne, the same camps from which it had departed on 18 December 1944, completing a cycle of exactly two months in the line. (HQ 82d Airborne Division, Story of the Belgian Bulge, 1945, Sec. II)

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Bibliography

• HQ 82d Airborne Division. The Story of the 82d Airborne Division in the Battle of the Belgian Bulge, in the Siegfried Line and on the Roer River. N.p.: HQ 82d Airborne Division, 1945. Scanned from the copy of George C. Melahn, 505th PIR (March 2023).